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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit a court deciding whether a defendant is
mentally retarded and exempt from the death
penalty under Atkins v. Virginia from considering
the defendant’s race or ethnicity.
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INTEREST OF AMICI1
Amici are scholars who teach and write about
constitutional law, civil rights, criminal law, and
science law and policy. Nita Farahany is Professor of
Law, Genome Sciences & Policy, and Philosophy at
Duke Law School, where she teaches criminal law
and science law and policy. Gail Heriot is Professor
of Law at University of San Diego School of Law,
where she teaches civil rights; she is also a member
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Ilya Somin
is Professor of Law at George Mason University
School of Law, where he teaches constitutional law.
Ernest Young is Alston & Bird Professor of Law at
Duke Law School, where he teaches constitutional
law and federal courts. We file this brief in our
personal capacities as scholars and not on behalf of
our institutions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Hernandez’s petition for certiorari raises
an issue of national importance to the credibility of
the judicial system: can courts consider a defendant’s
race when deciding whether he is mentally retarded
and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under
Counsel of record for all parties received timely notice that
amici intended to file this brief, and all parties consented. No
counsel for a party has written this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party contributed money intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person or entity,
other than the amici curiae or their counsel, has contributed
money to this brief’s preparation or submission.
1
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Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)? This Court’s
precedents—and basic equality principles—say no.
We therefore urge this Court to grant certiorari on
Mr. Hernandez’s second question presented to make
that clear.
Atkins held that executing mentally retarded2
defendants violates the Eighth Amendment. Courts
implementing Atkins therefore must measure
defendants’ mental abilities.
That opens the door to measuring minority
defendants differently. Many critics, including
psychologists, believe that standard methods of
assessing mental retardation include potential racial
bias. To correct for that bias, common tests for
mental retardation urge measuring subjects against
their “cultural group.”
Prosecutors and courts nationally have seized
that opening to justify applying different standards
to minority defendants who claim, under Atkins, that
they cannot be sentenced to death. That is what
happened here. The government’s star witness
argued that Mr. Hernandez’s poor functioning was
consistent with his “cultural group,” defined as
people with poor achievement, drug use, poverty,
After Atkins, psychologists changed the name of this diagnosis
to “intellectual disability.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Intellectual
Disability
Fact
Sheet
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Intellectual%20Disability%20
Fact%20Sheet.pdf. We follow this Court’s terminology in
Atkins and use “mentally retarded.”
2
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and criminal behavior. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit concluded that Hernandez’s
intelligence quotient (IQ) was better measured
against other “Mexicans.” Prosecutors are making,
and courts are accepting, similar arguments across
the country.
This Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence
demands that such arguments satisfy strict scrutiny.
Those arguments are classic racial classifications:
prosecutors contend that minority defendants, as a
group, test differently and therefore should be
treated differently. When a criminal defendant is on
trial for his life, using race to decide his fate is
unacceptable unless justified under the mostrigorous scrutiny. The state has not even tried to
make that showing here.
Such an argument also shows why this Court
applies strict scrutiny to all racial classifications,
whatever the rationale. Under the guise of racial
sensitivity, that argument justifies making it easier
to execute minority defendants. Strict scrutiny was
designed to test such suspect arguments.
To be clear, our argument here is narrow. Mr.
Hernandez has not claimed to be innocent of the
awful crimes that he was convicted of, and we take
no position on what his ultimate fate should be. We
also express no view whether Mr. Hernandez
actually is mentally retarded; on remand, a properly
race-neutral evaluation might find him ineligible for
exemption from the death penalty under Atkins. Nor
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do we even take a position on whether Atkins was
correctly decided.
But taking Atkins as settled, this case
illustrates the urgency of the elder Justice Harlan’s
insistence that “[o]ur constitution is color-blind.”
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). When the government is deciding
who lives and dies, it cannot use different scales for
different races. This Court should grant certiorari
on the petitioner’s second issue to make that point
plain.
ARGUMENT
I.

As This Case Illustrates, Atkins Opened
the Door for Prosecutors to Use Race to
Measure Defendants’ Intellect.

Atkins gives prosecutors the opportunity to
argue that courts should change their standards for
minorities when deciding whether defendants are
mentally retarded. Atkins and courts implementing
it rely on clinical and legal standards that encourage
considering
“sociocultural
background”
when
interpreting mental assessments. Because many
believe bias causes minorities to perform worse on
those assessments, prosecutors argue that courts can
presume that minority defendants actually are abler
than their assessment results suggest.
Here, the government’s expert testified that
Mr. Hernandez functioned normally given his
“cultural group.” Lower courts accepted that

5
testimony, and the Fifth Circuit added that
“Mexican” norms should be applied to score
Hernandez’s IQ. Such arguments are common in
state and federal courts across the country. The time
is ripe for this Court to close the door on those
arguments.
A.

Atkins
Requires
Comparing
Defendants to a Population, Which
Opens
the
Door
to
Racial
Comparisons.

Rather than crafting a legal definition of
mental retardation to guide states, the Atkins Court
left to the states the responsibility for deciding who
qualifies as mentally retarded. It cited approvingly
two clinical definitions, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 317-18,
which many states have incorporated. But there are
substantial differences in how states decide who
qualifies as mentally retarded and who does not,
leading to impermissible disparate treatment of like
individuals. See Nita Farahany, Cruel and Unequal
Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 879 (2009).
Both clinical standards Atkins approved
require “[1] not only subaverage intellectual
functioning, [2] but also significant limitations in
adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and
self-direction [3] that became manifest before age
18.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
The first two criteria require measuring the
defendant against some population. Psychologists
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typically use IQ tests to assess intellectual
functioning. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 42 (4th ed.
2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. IQ scores are
generated by locating the individual’s performance
on the population’s distribution. Similarly, whether
someone has adapted normally to his environment
depends on the environment. A fifteen-year-old
might not know how to use a fork because he is
mentally retarded or because he grew up in a culture
that does not use forks.
The question becomes, what is the relevant
population courts should compare the defendant to?
Legal and clinical standards that Atkins relied on
open the door to impermissibly using race to define
that population.
Some critics contend that clinical assessments
are racially biased and therefore underestimate
minorities’ abilities. Many have charged that
implicit biases in IQ tests disadvantage minorities.
Jeffrey Usman, Capital Punishment, Cultural
Competency, and Litigating Intellectual Disability,
42 U. MEM. L. REV. 855, 890-93 (2012) (collecting
authorities).
In
other
contexts—especially
education—critics have urged assuming that
minorities’ test scores are artificially low.3 Similar
E.g., Ford ex rel. Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 291
F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Theresa Glennon, Race,
Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS.
L. REV. 1237, 1258-59 (1995); Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G.
Weiner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools:
3
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logic supports adjusting expectations for adaptive
functioning to compensate for racial bias.
Consequently, the clinical standards Atkins
relied on encourage compensating for potential
cultural bias. The DSM-IV-TR instructs clinicians
interpreting IQ-test results to “take into account
factors that may limit test performance” such as
“sociocultural background.” DSM-IV-TR at 42. It
defines adaptive functioning as “how well” the
person “meet[s] the standard of personal
independence expected of someone in their . . .
sociocultural background.” Id. The American
Association of Mental Retardation4 agrees that
assessments must consider “cultural . . . diversity.”
Am. Ass’n of Mental Retardation, Mental
Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems
of Supports 8 (10th ed. 2002). Recently revised
clinical standards, such as the DSM-V, similarly
require norming IQ scores “for the individual’s
sociocultural background” and assessing adaptive
functioning “in comparison to others of similar . . .
sociocultural background.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 37 (5th ed. 2013).

Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate Placements,
36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 440-41 (2001).
Now called the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities.
4
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Many states, relying on those clinical
definitions, permit or even require considering the
defendant’s “culture” when assessing his IQ or
adaption.5 As a result, prosecutors and courts facing
Atkins claims are encouraged to assess the
defendant in light of his “culture.”
But a vague standard like “sociocultural
group” often is in the eye of the beholder. As the
record in this case illustrates, “culture” can become a
proxy for race, and racial stereotypes easily can
influence how a cultural group is defined. Thus
efforts to compensate for racial bias in mentalretardation assessments may be well intentioned,
but they risk the opposite effect.
It is not inevitable that courts will misapply
Atkins and use racial decisionmaking. Courts can—
and we expect most courts do—decide Atkins claims
without referring to race. But by requiring courts to
E.g., Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 609 (Tenn. 2012) (courts
may consider “cultural differences” when reviewing IQ scores);
People v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 571 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) (during assessment an individual’s culture or
ethnicity must be considered), vacated on other grounds, 109
P.3d 68 (2005); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-753(K)(1) (defining
“[a]daptive behavior” as “personal independence and social
responsibility expected of the defendant’s age and cultural
group”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1g(c) (requiring using IQ tests
that are “culturally appropriate” and defining “adaptive
behavior” as “personal independence and social responsibility
expected for the individual’s age and cultural group as
measured by tests that are . . . culturally appropriate to the
individual”); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 591.003
(defining “[a]daptive behavior” similarly).
5

9
compare defendants’ mental functioning to the
population, Atkins opens the door to courts
improperly letting race define that population.
Thus prosecutors can argue that because of
assessment bias, minority defendants’ IQ scores and
adaptive functioning are greater than tests would
suggest, so minorities who appear to meet the
standard for mental retardation actually can be put
to death. In short, prosecutors can argue that when
compared to people of the same race rather than the
American population, minority defendants are able
enough to be executed.
B.

Prosecutors and the Lower Courts
Measured
Hernandez’s
Mental
Abilities against His Ethnicity.

That happened here. Indisputably, Mr.
Hernandez sat on the border of a mental-retardation
diagnosis. Most of his IQ scores were within the
mental-retardation range, defined as 70 or below.
Pet’r. Br. 6; DSM-IV-TR at 41-42.6 Some factual
testimony suggested that Hernandez’s adaptive
functioning was poor.7 Pet’r. Br. 7. Two psychologists
who examined him, including the only one who
IQ tests have a five-point measurement error, so scores as
high as 75 can qualify. DSM-IV-TR at 41-42.
6

Other testimony undermined that conclusion. See Hernandez
v. Stephens, --- F. App’x ---, 2013 WL 3957796, at *4-5 (5th Cir.
Aug. 2, 2013). We take no position on whether Mr. Hernandez’s
adaptive functioning actually is impaired; we simply urge that
race should not influence that determination.
7
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administered a full-scale IQ test to Hernandez,
diagnosed him as mentally retarded. Id. at 6-7.
The prosecution’s expert (who did not examine
Hernandez), Dr. Richard Coons, testified that
Hernandez was not mentally retarded. Relevant
here, Dr. Coons relied on Texas law that defines
“adaptive behavior” as “the effectiveness with or
degree to which a person meets the standards of
personal independence and social responsibility
expected of the person’s age and cultural group.”
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 591.003; Ex parte
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Dr. Coons concluded, “Mr. Hernandez’s
adaptive behavior is in keeping with his cultural
group.” Coons Aff. 9.8 In his affidavit, Dr. Coons
explained that conclusion using numerous racially
tinged comments:


“Mr. Hernandez was raised under rather
primitive circumstances. The family home was
a lower class dwelling in a lower
socioeconomic neighborhood adjacent to a
landfill. His family sifted through the refuse
in the landfill for marketable items. Mr.
Hernandez had little effective parental
attention. Such was his developmental
culture.” Coons Aff. 8.

“Coons Aff.” refers to Affidavit of Richard Coons, J.D., M.D.,
Ex parte Hernandez, No. A 97-364, Jun. 1, 2005. “Coons Tr.”
refers to a portion of testimony presented during the state trial
court’s habeas corpus proceedings.
8
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“Mr. Hernandez has held numerous low level
jobs and has lived under circumstances which
were in keeping with his cultural group.” Id.



“For his cultural group, Mr. Hernandez has
seemed to adapt in terms of personal
independence and has lived independently for
years in circumstances comparable to those in
which he was raised.” Id.



“Mr. Hernandez has exhibited the level of
social responsibility of the criminal element of
his cultural group.” Id.



“Mr. Hernandez’s cultural group tends to have
low socioeconomic status, low achievement,
decreased social skills, increased substance
abuse, and increased level of criminal
behavior.” Id. at 8-9.

Dr. Coons followed that affidavit with live
testimony. Asked to describe Mr. Hernandez’s
cultural group, Dr. Coons testified that he could not
give a precise definition. Coons Tr. 73:9-16. But his
testimony strongly suggested that Mexican
stereotypes colored his conception:


Hernandez used drugs and put his safety in
danger because “that’s a common thing in that
cultural group.” Id. at 86:12-21.

12


“Well, he’s hanging out with these—you know,
he’s using and selling drugs and so forth,
that’s in keeping with his cultural group. He
talked about his—you know, his hobby was
using drugs.” Id. at 88:3-7.



“From the age of—I don’t know, 10 or 12, up
until the time he was incarcerated, he was
using a huge amount of drugs. So, you know,
I—and the people he was hanging around
with, and selling drugs, and all this, I mean,
he fit in with that group. That was his social
group and so forth. And drugs were his
hobbies he told Dr. Puente. So during this
period of time, you know, that is a way to
adapt in the culture that he’s in. That’s a part
of his culture.” Id. at 204:18 to 205:2.



“But it’s a drug related, culturally related
issue.” Id. at 205:10-11.



Hernandez’s drug use “was a significant part
of his cultural group at that time.” Id. at
205:15-17.

Over repeated arguments by Hernandez’s
counsel that this testimony violated the Equal
Protection Clause,9 the state and federal lower
In the state trial court Hernandez moved to strike this
testimony because, among other reasons, Dr. Coons’s racial
profiling violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez’s
counsel raised the same argument on appeal in state and
federal courts.
9
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courts consistently credited Dr. Coons. Relying on
Dr. Coons, lower courts rejected testimony from two
physicians who (unlike Dr. Coons) examined
Hernandez and diagnosed him mentally retarded.
The Fifth Circuit added another race-based
reason to conclude Hernandez was not mentally
retarded. On his one full-scale IQ test, Hernandez
scored 62 using American norms and 70 (the highest
score in the mental-retardation range) using
Mexican norms. Pet’r. Br. 6.
The Fifth Circuit discounted Hernandez’s 62
score and other scores well under 70 based on
Hernandez’s ethnicity. “When scaled to Mexican
norms, Hernandez scored exactly 70 on the one fullscale WAIS-III test.” Hernandez, 2013 WL 3957796,
at *6.
Together, Dr. Coons and the Fifth Circuit
transformed Atkins into an opportunity for racial
decisionmaking. Facing a borderline defendant, Dr.
Coons and the Fifth Circuit used Hernandez’s
ethnicity to lower their expectations for his
performance—and sentence him to death.
C.

Courts and Prosecutors Nationally
Are Using Race to Assess Mental
Abilities.

Remarkably, Mr. Hernandez’s case is far from
isolated. Across the country, prosecutors and courts
are seizing Atkins’s opening and arguing that
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minority defendants claiming mental retardation
should be held to lower standards. In these factintensive inquiries, courts disagree wildly how
seriously to take such arguments.
Across the country, prosecution experts are
testifying that minority defendants’ IQ scores should
be increased or that defendants’ impaired adaptive
functioning is normal given the defendant’s
“culture.” Prosecution experts have testified to the
following:


“Cultural” factors could have “artificially
suppressed” the defendant’s IQ scores, so his
scores had to be adjusted upward. Maldonado
v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2010)
(holding that even excluding this testimony,
the defendant could not show he was mentally
retarded and could be executed).



A Hispanic defendant’s poor adaptation
should be discounted because he was a
member of “the criminal socio-culture.”
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 58 A.3d 62, 72-73
(Pa. 2012) (reopening Atkins proceedings to
consider the government’s new evidence and
declining to decide the defendant’s crossappeal).



A defendant’s low IQ scores could be
discounted because “IQ tests tend to
underestimate particularly the intelligence of
African-Americans.” Hodges v. State, 55 So.3d

15
515, 525 (Fla. 2010) (affirming finding that
the defendant was not mentally retarded).


“[A]ll” the defendant’s “IQ scores that I know
in the school records that indicate school
scores measured by IQ that would be
indicative of mild mental retardation, if they
were not spuriously lowered by things such as
exposure to domestic violence, poverty,
cultural deprivation, ethnicity, perhaps
intoxication.” Ex parte Smith, No. 1080973,
2010 WL 4148528, at *3, 7 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010)
(emphasis added) (affirming finding that the
defendant was not mentally retarded).



“My opinion would be that his intellectual
function may be slightly higher than that.
Sometimes individuals of African-American
background don’t score quite as high on
formal testing.” Brown v. State, 982 So.2d 565,
604 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).



“I.Q. tests have historically been biased
against minorities. . . . [I]f you have an
African-American who tests in the seventies,
the clinician must be very cautious . . . .”
Black v. State, No. M2004-01345-CCA-R3-PD,
2005 WL 2662577, at *7-8, 14 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Oct. 19, 2005) (affirming finding that the
defendant was not mentally retarded).



The defendant’s scores did not necessarily
show mental retardation because the verbal
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IQ test “is really culturally based.” Ex parte
Rodriguez, 164 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. Crim.
App.
2005) (Cochran,
J.,
concurring)
(affirming finding that the defendant was not
mentally retarded).


The defendant’s IQ score should be raised 3 to
6 points because the test is “culturally
prejudiced against him.” Johnson v. State, 102
S.W.3d 535, 539 n.10 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(remanding for further consideration of the
defendant’s Atkins claim).

Prosecutors nationally similarly are urging
courts to disregard, discount, or even adjust minority
defendants’ IQ scores. E.g., Commonwealth v.
Williams, 61 A.3d 979, 989 (Pa. 2013) (prosecution
unsuccessfully tried to dismiss childhood IQ tests
because those tests “were culturally and racially
biased”); Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75879, 2010 WL
1817772, at *11-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(prosecution unsuccessfully argued that the courts
should have added 7.5 points to the defendant’s IQ
because “Hispanic test subjects historically score 7.5
points lower on IQ tests than Caucasian subjects”).
Some courts have criticized such arguments.
One prosecution expert, in two different cases,
intentionally normed the black defendants’ IQ scores
on a special, race-based standard and concluded that
the defendants were not mentally retarded. United
States v. Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d 482, 500 (E.D. La.
2011); United States v. Hardy, 762 F. Supp. 2d 849,
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912-13 (E.D. La. 2010). The expert further classified
one of the defendants as “an African-American from
the South.” Hardy, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 912. The
district court emphatically rejected that expert’s
testimony, pointing out that some black defendants
could not possibly score in the mental-retardation
range using her equation. Id. at 912-13; Smith, 790
F. Supp. 2d at 500.
In another case, courts rejected the
prosecution’s argument that a defendant’s verbal IQ
score of 66 was unreliable because the defendant
spoke Spanish and English, even though he was
educated in English. Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d
349, 361 (5th Cir. 2007); Rivera v. Dretke, No. Civ. B03-139, 2006 WL 870927, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2007), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rivera v.
Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349. The district court found
“very troubling”—and possibly unconstitutional—the
argument that Americans whose first language is
not English essentially cannot prove mental
retardation because their scores should be
discounted. Rivera, 2006 WL 870927, at *18-19.
But other courts have accepted and applied
such arguments to sentence minority defendants to
death.
For example, an Ohio appellate court
concluded, relying on the prosecution’s expert, that
the defendant’s IQ score of 69 was “artificially lower”
because of racial bias. State v. Were, 2005 Ohio 376,
¶¶ 70-81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). Because the
defendant was black, the court concluded, his IQ did
not show mental retardation. Id. The Ohio Supreme
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Court agreed and affirmed. State v. Were, 890 N.E.2d
263, 293 (Ohio 2008).
One federal district court even rejected a
mental-retardation diagnosis based on low IQ scores
because the psychologist “failed to adequately
account for cultural differences” given the
defendant’s Colombian birth. Ortiz v. United States,
No. 04-8001-CV-W-GAF, 2007 WL 7686126, at *3
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 664
F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 2011). The psychologist testified
that he normed the defendant against American
standards because the defendant was in the U.S.
legal system. Id. at *3-4. The district court disagreed
and insisted that Colombian, not American, norms
were appropriate. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed
that aspect of the district court’s decision. Ortiz, 664
F.3d at 1167.10
Thus measuring minority defendants’ mental
abilities differently is a national phenomenon.
Certainly some kinds of arguments implicating
ethnic background do not raise concerns; defendants
like Mr. Hernandez who do not speak English
fluently, or at all, should be tested in a language
Other courts have expressly or implicitly encouraged
considering whether race or ethnicity explains low IQ scores.
E.g., Eldrige v. Quarterman, No. H-05-1847, 2008 WL 700949,
at *14 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2008) (pointing out that an expert
conceded “evidence that minorities score artificially low” on IQ
tests); Webster v. United States, No. 4:00-CV-1646, 2003 WL
23109787, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2003) (same); State v.
Vela, 777 N.W.2d 266, 296 (Neb. 2010).
10
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they understand. And knowing whether a defendant
grew up in a country that does not use forks could
help explain why the defendant does not know how
to use one. But the statements and arguments in Mr.
Hernandez’s case and the cases cited here go much
further, crossing the line into very suspect
stereotyping.
Courts disagree wildly about how to address
such arguments. True, cases do not show a clean, upor-down split in authority. But that reflects the
intensely fact-dependent nature of adjudicating
whether a defendant is mentally retarded. As these
cases show, and as the record here shows, courts
consider testimony and arguments about minorities’
mental abilities as part of a wide-ranging, holistic
assessment of the defendant. The factual nature of
Atkins claims does not immunize them from this
Court’s review, and lower courts need this Court’s
clarification on this issue.
This Court’s review is also needed because
arguments relying on defendants’ race likely will
persist. Prosecutors have incentive to make these
arguments whenever minority defendants, like Mr.
Hernandez, test on the border of mental
retardation—and many if not all Atkins claims will
fall into that category.11 This Court should grant
certiorari to emphatically clarify that using race to
Eighty-five percent of people whose IQ scores fall in the
mental-retardation range score at the upper end of that range,
from about 50 or 55 to 70. See DSM-IV-TR at 42; Atkins v.
Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 323 (Va. 2000), rev’d on other
11
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assess Atkins claims must meet the strictest
scrutiny.
II.

Mental-Retardation Evaluations under
Atkins Must Be Race Neutral or Satisfy
Strict Scrutiny.

As this Court’s precedents already make clear,
such arguments are suspect racial classifications.
The government simply cannot apply different
standards for mental retardation depending on the
defendant’s race without triggering strict scrutiny.
Indeed the government’s and the courts’
reasoning here shows why strict scrutiny is
necessary. The courts apparently lowered standards
for Mr. Hernandez’s ability because of his ethnicity.
The government cannot make it easier to execute
minority defendants without satisfying the most
exacting scrutiny—and we are deeply skeptical that
the government can.
A.

All Race Classifications, Especially
in Criminal Prosecutions, Must
Meet Strict Scrutiny.

This Court has made crystal clear that all
racial classifications—whatever the justification—
must satisfy strict scrutiny. E.g., Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
grounds sub nom. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304. And few
people who test much below a 50 or 55 likely have the capacity
to commit crimes and stand trial.
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720, 742-43 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
270 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995). That prohibition rests on
vital philosophical and practical principles.
The
Fourteenth
Amendment’s
“central
mandate is racial neutrality in governmental
decisionmaking.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
904 (1995). That mandate reflects the principle that
“distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at
745-46 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 214).
And “such classifications ultimately have a
destructive impact on the individual and our
society.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
They “reinforce the belief, held by too many for too
much of our history, that individuals should be
judged by the color of their skin,” Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 657 (1993), “promote notions of racial
inferiority,” and “lead to a politics of racial hostility,”
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989).
Those principles apply with particular force in
the justice system—especially when defendants are
on trial for their lives. This Court has long stressed
that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that
race discrimination be eliminated from all official
acts and proceedings of the State is most compelling
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in the judicial system.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
415 (1991). Even when litigants would otherwise
have unfettered decisionmaking—such as when
prosecutors bring charges or litigants exercise
peremptory challenges—they cannot apply racial
classifications. Id.
Flatly prohibiting race in the courtroom is
essential to preserving defendants’ and the
community’s confidence in the justice system. “Race
discrimination within the courtroom raises serious
questions as to the fairness of the proceedings
conducted there.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). “Few places are a more
real expression of the constitutional authority of the
government than a courtroom, where the law itself
unfolds. Within the courtroom, the government
invokes its laws to determine the rights of those who
stand before it.” Id.
This Court made those statements when
explaining why civil litigants cannot use raced-based
peremptory challenges. See id. Here, Hernandez is
literally on trial for his life. If our “color-blind”
Constitution means anything, it must guarantee
Hernandez a death sentence free from suspicion that
race affected his punishment.
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B.

Using Race to Measure Defendants’
Mental
Abilities
Is
an
Impermissible
Racial
Classification.

Here, proceedings in the lower courts raise
suspicion that race indeed infected Hernandez’s
death sentence. And as we have explained,
Hernandez is not alone. Prosecutors, their experts,
and some courts openly contend that minority
defendants’ mental abilities must be measured
differently. That violates basic equal-protection
principles.
This Court repeatedly has stressed that “our
Constitution protects each citizen as an individual,
not as a member of a group.” Parents Involved, 551
U.S. at 743 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)). “Reduction of an individual to an
assigned racial identity for differential treatment is
among the most pernicious actions our government
can undertake.” Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
Consequently, this Court has repeatedly held
that the government must satisfy strict scrutiny
before using different yardsticks to measure
minorities. For example, in Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, this Court held that placing
applicants on different admissions “tracks” based on
race was unconstitutional. 438 U.S. 265, 315-16
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Gratz similarly
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rejected a university’s admissions-scoring system
that awarded minority applicants 20 extra points.
539 U.S. at 271-72. And Parents Involved struck
down a school-assignment system because “race, for
some students, [wa]s determinative standing alone.”
551 U.S. at 723.
Here the government and the Fifth Circuit
equally placed Hernandez in a different category
because of his race. Dr. Coons repeatedly testified
that Hernandez had to be evaluated within his
“cultural group.” The Fifth Circuit insisted that
Hernandez’s IQ scores were best normed against
other “Mexicans.”
Similar arguments are cropping up across the
country. Prosecutors are urging, quite literally, that
7.5 points must be added to Hispanics’ IQ scores.
Lizcano, 2010 WL 1817772, at *11-12. State experts
want to add “3 to 6 points” to minority defendants’
scores. Johnson, 102 S.W.3d at 539 n.10.
For many defendants, those points literally
mean the difference between life and death. In Were,
the defendant’s IQ was 69—within but near the top
of the mental-retardation range. 890 N.E.2d at 29091. The courts discounted that score, and sentenced
him to death, because as a minority his score had to
be regarded as artificially low. Id. at 293.
Even more than in school admissions or
assignment, different yardsticks cannot be used to
sentence minority defendants to death. This Court
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needs to make clear that assessing minority
defendants’ Atkins claims differently is an
impermissible racial classification. If prosecutors
want to argue that minority defendants should be
evaluated differently, prosecutors—if they can—
must justify that notion under the strictest scrutiny.
C.

This Case Illustrates Why Racial
Classifications Must Satisfy Strict
Scrutiny.

This case beautifully demonstrates why this
Court has repeatedly insisted that racial
classifications must satisfy strict scrutiny, even
when the justification purportedly is “benign” or
benefits minorities. E.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S.
at 741-42; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653; Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 225-27; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell,
J.).
All “[r]acial classifications raise special fears
that they are motivated by an invidious purpose.”
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also
ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
racial prejudice or stereotype.” J.A. Croson, 488 U.S.
at 493.
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That is essential because “[i]t may not always
be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.”
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 742 (quoting Adarand,
515 U.S. at 226). As this Court recognizes, our
“[h]istory should teach greater humility.” Id.
(quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 497 U.S. at 609
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)). Our nation has a long,
unfortunate history of relying on “science” or
fashionable theories to “help” minorities by
discriminating against them. See Parents Involved,
551 U.S. at 772-82 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(cataloguing that history); see generally Kevin
Brown, The Racial Gap in Ability: from the Fifteenth
Century to Grutter and Gratz, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2061
(2004) (describing the history of using racial
“science,” including IQ tests, to justify treating
minorities differently).
Indeed, a core objective of the Equal
Protection Clause’s framers was to change a tragic
history of using race to impose criminal punishments
and the death penalty. See Randall Kennedy, Race,
Crime, and the Law 77 (1997). At a minimum, the
Equal Protection Clause requires colorblind deathpenalty sentences.
In Mr. Hernandez’s case, there is good reason
to suspect that the lower courts and the government
relied on impermissible racial stereotypes. The Fifth
Circuit insisted on applying lower, “Mexican” norms,
even though Hernandez committed his crimes in the
United States and was being prosecuted in an
American court. And Dr. Coons apparently relied on
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a grab-bag of pernicious racial stereotypes to define
Mr.
Hernandez’s
“cultural
group”:
“low
socioeconomic status, low achievement, decreased
social skills, increased substance abuse, and
increased level of criminal behavior.” Coons Aff. 8-9.
As we have explained, Mr. Hernandez is far
from alone. Mr. Smith, for example, deserved to have
the government explain what on earth its expert
meant when he testified that the defendant’s IQ
scores would have established mental retardation “if
they were not spuriously lowered by things such as
. . . ethnicity.” Ex parte Smith, 2010 WL 4148528, at
*3.
Indeed, Atkins’s implicit reliance on standards
that measure ability by “culture” opens the door to
all manner of racial hokum. In one case, a defense
expert tried to explain why the defendant’s IQ score
was not artificially low because he was “Asian.” Van
Tran v. State, No. W2005-01334-CCA-R3-PD, 2006
WL 3327828, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006).
She argued that “any bias in the testing scores
would favor Asians over Caucasians” because “Asian
Americans tend to score higher than Caucasians on
tests of cognitive ability.” Id. She even added that
one study indicated that “Asian’s [sic] in general
have larger brains than Caucasians.” Id.
“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke
out’” that kind of nonsense. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at
493. And the consequences here prove why. Under
the guise of cultural sensitivity, prosecutors and the
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lower courts devised an argument for executing
minority defendants more easily than whites. The
lower courts’ reasoning here amounts to the
conclusion that Hernandez is eligible for the death
penalty because he’s pretty smart for a Mexican.
The Constitution demands more. Mr.
Hernandez and defendants like him are being
prosecuted in the United States for violating
American legal norms. We cannot think of any
reason why those defendants should not also be held
to American norms when deciding whether they are
exempt from the death penalty under Atkins. At a
minimum, the government should justify arguments
to the contrary under the strictest scrutiny.
This Court should grant certiorari to make
clear that Atkins is not an opportunity to use race
when imposing the death penalty. This Court should
remand this case with instructions that lower courts
reconsider Mr. Hernandez’s Atkins claim without
using impermissible race classifications. The risks of
letting racial nonsense influence who lives or dies
are just too great.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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